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The Macedonian Crisis –  
A failure of EU conflict management? 
Erwan Fouéré 
n the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, there is a chapter 
devoted to “An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises”. It sets out a ‘multi-
dimensional’ approach through the use of all available policies and instruments aimed at 
‘conflict prevention, management and resolution’.   
The difficulty of transforming such lofty aspirations into reality couldn’t be more evident than 
in the ongoing and deepening crisis in Macedonia – an EU candidate country in the heart of the 
Western Balkans.  
The eruption of violence on April 27th was a tragedy waiting to happen. The Parliament building 
was stormed by an angry mob, which proceeded to viciously attack several MPs from the main 
opposition Social Democratic Union for Integration (SDSM) party, injuring many, including the 
party’s leader Zoran Zaev. The attack was preceded by weeks of deep tensions following the 
early elections that took place in December. It was also the latest in a series of crises and violent 
incidents that have marked the past years of the government led by the ruling Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(VMRO-DPMNE) party under its leader and former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, in power 
since 2006. Under his leadership the government has pursued an ethno-nationalist and populist 
agenda resulting in one of the worst reform records in the Western Balkan region.  
Following the December elections, in which VMRO-DPMNE obtained the most Parliamentary 
seats (51 as opposed to 49 for the SDSM), Nikola Gruevski attempted to form a new coalition 
government with its erstwhile partner, the main ethnic Albanian Democratic Union for 
Integration party (DUI) (which obtained 10 seats). These negotiations broke down at the end 
of January, however, when Gruevski and his party refused to accept DUI’s proposal for the 
continuation of the mandate of the Special Prosecutor appointed in 2015 under an EU-
brokered agreement to investigate the wiretapping scandal that had revealed shocking 
examples of corruption at the highest levels of government.  
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Subsequently, the SDSM succeeded in putting forward a proposed coalition with the ethnic 
Albanian parties with a sufficient majority of 67 MPs (out of a total of 120) to form a new 
government. However, President Ivanov, closely aligned to the ruling party and no doubt acting 
under its instructions, refused (and continues to refuse) to hand over the mandate to the 
proposed coalition, claiming that to do so would endanger the unity of the country. He was 
referring in particular to the Platform adopted in January by the ethnic Albanian parties, which 
set out a number of aspirations for the ethnic Albanian community (which according to the 
2002 census represents some 25% of the Macedonian population of 2 million). 
The leader of the VMRO-DPMNE, fearful of losing power, claimed that the proposals put 
forward by the ethnic Albanian parties would result in “federalisation” and eventually the 
break-up of Macedonia as a unified country, even though such a concept was not part of the 
proposals and despite the fact that he himself had raised no objections when these proposals 
were raised in his negotiations with the DUI. 
With all the parties concerned having made clear that the preservation of the unity and identity 
of Macedonia was an objective that united the entire country, it became clear that Gruevski’s 
strategy was to wave the red flag of inter-ethnic tensions in order to discredit the proposed 
coalition. In so doing, he called on the citizens to take to the streets to “defend the country”, 
and accused his political opponents of treason. Many of those who stormed the Parliament on 
April 27th are known to be friends, supporters and even family members of the ruling party.  
Further violence cannot be excluded as the country awaits the response from the President to 
the formal notification sent to him of the election of the new Speaker. According to the 
constitution, he has 10 days from the date of notification within which to hand over the 
mandate to form a government to whichever party or coalition commands a majority in 
Parliament. The new majority then has 20 days to agree on a new cabinet which is then put to 
a vote in the Parliament. Mr Gruevski has already announced that his party does not recognise 
the new Speaker as duly elected. A boycott of Parliament by his party, which would surely 
exacerbate the tensions, cannot be excluded. 
The origins of this most recent crisis can be traced to the revelation in January 2015 of a vast 
wiretapping operation providing evidence of alleged corruption by government ministers and 
senior officials from the ruling party. This was followed in early May of that year by an outbreak 
of violence in the northern city of Kumanovo, which resulted in the death of eight police officers 
and 12 others, in a security operation that has yet to be properly investigated. A succession of 
mediation efforts in June 2015 and again in July of 2016, led by Commissioner Johannes Hahn 
together with a delegation from the European Parliament (composed of the current and 
previous Rapporteurs for Macedonia plus a member of the EPP, of which the VMRO-DPMNE is 
a member), resulted in a number of agreements, signed by all four main political parties. They 
provided inter alia for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate the wiretapping 
scandal, electoral reforms to be followed by early elections and the implementation of a list of 
reforms contained in a report adopted by a senior expert group mandated by the Commission 
to investigate the wiretapping scandal and related rule of law issues.  
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Despite these agreements, the ruling party did everything possible to delay implementation of 
the reforms and to hinder the work of the Special Prosecutor. These delays provoked renewed 
inter-party tensions. As if this wasn’t enough, the President issued in April 2016 a blanket 
pardon to the 56 senior government and ruling party officials, including the former Prime 
Minister himself, who had been placed under investigation by the Special Prosecutor. The 
objective was clear: to deliver a mortal blow to the work of the Special Prosecutor.  
Recent experience in Macedonia has shown that the lack of any enforcement mechanism 
deployed by the EU to ensure a serious follow-up of all the commitments contained in these 
successive mediated agreements is a major factor in their ineffectiveness. In the same vein, the 
messages coming from the EU have not always been consistent. At times, the EU has given the 
impression that its highest priority was stability, particularly during the refugee crisis, and that 
rule of law issues would eventually sort themselves out. This was particularly the case with 
Commissioner Hahn’s statement following his visit in January 2016, which seemed to prioritise 
a strong and stable government to better address the flow of refugees coming across the 
Western Balkans, with Macedonia being a major entry point. This, despite the fact that the 
country was still in the throes of the political crisis resulting from the wiretapping revelations. 
When the President of the Council Donald Tusk visited on April 4th of this year, the main focus 
of his remarks following his meeting with President Ivanov was the importance of Macedonia’s 
cooperation with migration and border controls. His reference to the political crisis was limited 
to calling on the President to “find a solution based on democratic principles, decency and 
common sense”. He did not repeat or make any reference to the statement made by HR 
Federica Mogherini during her visit on March 2nd, when she directly called on President Ivanov 
to reverse his decision and, even quoting the Constitution, to “entrust the mandate to a 
candidate belonging to the party which has the majority in the Assembly”. This message was 
fortunately repeated by Hahn during his own visit on March 21st. 
All of this has given the impression of a weak and uncoordinated EU conflict-resolution 
machinery. It has contributed to an increased sense of impunity by the ruling party, which 
continues to ignore all the recommendations for reforms set out in the successive 
Commission’s country reports, and in the senior expert group report mentioned above. It 
continues to deploy its vast propaganda machinery abroad using its membership of the EPP to 
justify its behaviour and legitimacy in the Macedonian political environment. 
The stance of the European Peoples Party is also beyond comprehension. It continues to 
protect a party whose leader and senior officials are under investigation for serious criminal 
offences. Both the Austrian and Hungarian Foreign Ministers have gone even further, and 
attended election rallies of the ruling party prior to the December elections. The EPP continues 
to defend the indefensible, even after the violence of April 27th.  
If the EU is really serious about its role in conflict resolution, it needs to back its words with 
action. A periodic visit by a Commissioner or MEP delegation with no effective follow-up will 
serve little purpose. The EU should deploy all the instruments it has at its disposal, including a 
threat of sanctions, if the mediated agreements are not implemented. Failure of the EU to 
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resolve this ongoing crisis will send the worst possible message to the region where other 
‘Balkan strongmen’ are watching closely.  
